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Abstract 
Since the concept of the Land Degradation Neutrality (LDN) emerged in global policy 
discourse, a key point of contention has been the development of market-based instruments 
to promote the LDN agenda. Much of this discussion has focused on the use of LDN-specific 
offset mechanisms and private-public partnerships. However, there is also an opportunity to 
capitalise on the synergies that exist between LDN objectives and those of existing market-
based instruments that have previously been developed for carbon, biodiversity, bioenergy 
and in other contexts. LDN objectives could be integrated into such schemes through 
targeted eligibility rules and certification schemes, supporting methodologies, adaptations to 
multifunctional indices used in auction-based approaches and the restructuring of mandates, 
tax breaks and feed-in tariffs for bioenergy and other products. 
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Synergies between Land Degradation Neutrality goals and existing market-based 
instruments 
1. Introduction   
Sustainable Development Goal 15, adopted by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly 
in September 2015, calls for action to combat desertification, and halt and reverse land 
degradation (UN, 2015). More specifically, the concept of land degradation neutrality (LDN) 
is endorsed by target 15.3: “By 2030, combat desertification, restore degraded land and soil, 
including land affected by desertification, drought and floods, and strive to achieve a land 
degradation-neutral world”. This target complements and extends the work of the UN 
Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), which was established in 1994 and has 
been ratified by 195 countries and the European Union (UNCCD, 2018b). 
Despite science and policy acknowledging the extent and costs associated with land 
degradation (Gibbs and Salmon, 2015; Safriel, 2007; Zika and Erb, 2009; ELD Initiative, 
2015), the UNCCD has struggled to attract private sector support for combatting land 
degradation and the Global Environment Facility has historically allocated less funding to its 
land degradation project portfolio than to biodiversity and climate change (Chasek, 2013; 
Chasek et al., 2015). It is against this backdrop that the concept of a land degradation 
neutral world emerged in Rio+20, as an aspirational goal in ‘The future we want’ (United 
Nations System Task Team, 2012). Scientific experts have since worked on a technical 
definition of land degradation neutrality (LDN) in tandem with its insertion in the global 
sustainable development agenda (Safriel, 2017), with the definition adopted by the UNCCD 
being “a state whereby the amount and quality of land resources, necessary to support 
ecosystem functions and services and enhance food security, remains stable or increases 
within specified temporal and spatial scales and ecosystems” (UNCCD, 2015a, p. 10).  
The use of the ‘neutrality’ terminology in LDN, combined with the historical challenges in 
obtaining funding for land degradation projects, has evoked comparisons with offsetting 
mechanisms used for carbon and biodiversity and a focus on market-based instruments 
more broadly (Tal, 2015; Safriel 2017). This follows a broader trend of market-based or 
neoliberal influences on international environmental policy since the 1980s, including in 
relation to pollution, degradation, protection and restoration (Baumber, 2017b; Stavins, 
2000). Market-based thinking has also been influential on the post-2015 sustainable 
development agenda (Jomo et al., 2016; Pingeot, 2015), including the call by the United 
Nations General Assembly for businesses to apply their creativity and innovation to 
addressing the SDGs (UN, 2015). 
Market-based instruments (MBIs) can include a wide range of measures such as grants, 
subsidies, auctions, taxes, charges, penalties, tradable permits, public-private partnerships 
and certification programs. Many, but not all, MBIs can also be classed as payments for 
ecosystem (or environmental) services (PES). Grants, subsidies and tradeable permit 
schemes may qualify as PES if the arrangement is voluntary, involves at least one ‘seller’ 
and one ‘buyer’, and is conditional on the delivery of a well-defined environmental service or 
land use activity likely to secure that service (Wunder, 2005). In contrast, other MBIs may 
not qualify as PES, such as non-voluntary penalties or taxes used to incorporate 
environmental externalities (e.g. greenhouse gas emissions) into market prices for goods 
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and services, or voluntary certification schemes that influence consumer choices but do not 
involve direct payment for the ecosystem services that are enhanced or maintained. 
The ability of MBIs to increase the cost-effectiveness of public spending on environmental 
protection and restoration, as well as to increase the funding available from private sources, 
has previously been demonstrated in diverse contexts such as the United States, Costa 
Rica, Australia and Indonesia (Hellerstein et al., 2015; OECD, 2010; Porras et al., 2013). 
However, while MBIs may assist with these challenges, they also carry risks that certain 
projects will be compromised, simplified, under-valued or traded off against environmental 
destruction elsewhere. The opportunities and risks are likely to increase as schemes 
progress in complexity towards markets involving multiple buyers and sellers, with their 
increased requirement that environmental outcomes be substitutable for one another 
(Baumber, 2017b).  
With the UNCCD Strategic Framework 2018-2030 envisioning a future that avoids, 
minimises, and reverses desertification/land degradation while striving to achieve a land 
degradation-neutral world (UNCCD, 2017b), there is an opportunity for the Parties to the 
Convention, its Secretariat, implementation mechanisms and other advocates of LDN to 
learn from existing environmental markets. This has the potential to not only inform the 
development of LDN-specific MBIs, but also to identify and capitalise on synergies that may 
exist between existing environmental MBIs and the LDN agenda. In section 2, we discuss 
the extent to which market-based approaches have been explored to date in relation to LDN 
before analysing synergies with existing environmental MBIs for carbon, biodiversity and 
other factors in section 3. Section 4 considers the risks and challenges associated with the 
adaptation of existing MBIs and discusses possible pathways forward. 
 
2. Market-based approaches previously explored in relation to LDN 
Much of the discussion around market-based instruments and LDN has taken place in 
relation to the LDN Target Setting Programme (LDN TSP) and the LDN Fund. The LDN TSP 
was developed under the guidance of the UNCCD’s Science-Policy Interface to help set 
LDN targets at the national level, while the development of the LDN Fund has been led by 
the UNCCD Global Mechanism to leverage private finance to support the achievement of 
LDN. 
The LDN TSP, and LDN more broadly, is underpinned by a notion of “no net loss”, whereby 
any losses of health and productive land are balanced by commensurate gains (Cowie et al., 
2018). As this principle of “no net loss” also underpins market-based offsetting schemes 
applied to contexts such as biodiversity, wetlands and carbon, the potential for offsetting to 
also play a role in LDN has been hotly debated (see Chasek et al., 2015; Orr et al., 2017; 
Salvati and Carlucci, 2014; Stavi and Lal, 2015; Tal, 2015; Welton et al., 2015). Offsetting 
was most prominent during the tenure of Luc Gnacadja as UNCCD Executive Secretary 
from 2007 to 2013 (Safriel, 2017), particularly with the incorporation of the offsetting principle 
into a 2012 policy brief commissioned by the UNCCD Secretariat, which referred to land 
degradation neutrality as a situation “whereby land degradation is either avoided or offset by 
land restoration” (UNCCD, 2012). 
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COP12 in 2015 created opportunities for the UNCCD to further explore market-based 
offsetting mechanisms by reaching agreement on the LDN definition and requesting the 
Global Mechanism and the Secretariat to develop options for its implementation. While 
offsetting offers a potential mechanism for leveraging private financing for restoration, the 
development of a LDN-specific offsetting program also presents a range of challenges such 
as ensuring the reliability of trades, defining clear quantifiable units of measure, ensuring 
equivalence across a wide range of land types, risks related to time lags, concerns around 
community impacts and the risk of legitimising degrading practices that might not otherwise 
occur (Tal, 2015; Welton et al. 2015; Orr et al. 2017). 
The 2017 conceptual framework for LDN developed by the Science-Policy Interface of the 
UNCCD acknowledges the various challenges with offsetting, recommending that in the 
process of developing initiatives for LDN implementation, countries consider lessons learned 
and best practices from policies related to carbon and biodiversity offsetting (Orr et al., 
2017). More to the point, based on experiences from implementing biodiversity offsetting, 
the framework for LDN cautions on the potential legitimisation of degradation practices in 
cases where offsetting can be cheaper than to avoid, reduce or reverse degradation. Hence, 
the emphasis of the conceptual framework has been on a hierarchy of ‘Avoid-Reduce-
Reverse’ that, although it does not preclude the possibility of offsetting in the future, does not 
make it a central feature of the current framework for achieving LDN (Cowie et al., 2018). 
The LDN Fund (Impact Investment Fund for Land Degradation Neutrality) was launched at 
COP 13 in 2017 (UNCCD, 2017c). As of September 2018, commitments to the fund totalled 
USD 100 million towards a target of USD 300 million (UNCCD, 2018c). In its 2016 White 
Paper, the LDN Fund was pitched as a blended-finance mechanism to raise and deploy 
private finance for degradation avoidance and rehabilitation, because it was assumed that 
public funding will not be sufficient (Mirova and UNCCD, 2016). The Fund is managed under 
the natural capital platform of Mirova, a private sector investment management firm, with a 
separately-operated Technical Assistance Facility to support promising sustainable land use 
activities and build up a portfolio of bankable projects (Mwangi, 2017). To be eligible for 
investment through the LDN Fund, land management projects must meet four criteria 
(Mirova and UNCCD, 2016). These are: (1) having a high environmental and social 
contribution; (2) being large-scale or with potential for upscaling and replication; (3) being 
mature projects ready for investment (i.e. not at an early scoping stage); and (4) designed to 
be financially profitable for investors.  
The LDN Fund has been designed to take a landscape approach that includes collaboration 
between smallholders, local communities, business and government around activities such 
as sustainable agriculture, sustainable livestock management, agro-forestry, and sustainable 
forestry (UNCCD, 2018a). However, the requirements for projects to be mature, profitable 
and able to be replicated may make it difficult for emerging or innovative projects, ecological 
small-scale practices, or projects without a clear pathway to profitability to obtain funding, as 
well as creating a focus on reliable food and fibre projects over projects aimed at enhancing 
other types of ecosystem functions and services (Maillard and Cheung, 2016). This risk is 
highlighted by findings from a first group of 14 LDN target setting pilot projects that reported 
some very high costs for Sustainable Land Management (SLM) restoration and rehabilitation 
measures to combat desertification and land degradation (UNCCD, 2017a). For example, 
the pilot program estimated costs to be over USD 6000 per hectare in Chad, much higher 
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than previous estimates of “USD 20 to rehabilitate one hectare of farmland in Africa" 
(UNCCD, 2015b, p. 9). 
Given the risk that projects offering high social or environmental benefits but low profitability 
may be overlooked by the LDN fund, various researchers have explored methodologies for 
valuing ecosystem services related to LDN and targeting investment most cost-effectively 
(e.g. Dallimer and Stringer, 2018; Schild et al., 2018; Willemen et al., 2018). There is 
potential to further inform this work by drawing on experiences with other environmental 
MBIs used to promote carbon sequestration, biodiversity conservation and other ecosystem 
services. Furthermore, beyond seeking to develop LDN-specific MBIs, there may be 
opportunities to promote SLM, restoration and rehabilitation by adapting or ‘piggy-backing’ 
on existing market-based approaches used in other sectors. These potential synergies are 
explored in the following section. 
 
3. Potential synergies between LDN and existing environmental MBIs 
Addressing land degradation has synergies with other global environmental objectives, 
particularly around carbon sequestration and biodiversity conservation. Throughout its 
history, the UNCCD has been eager to capitalise on these synergies (Grainger, 2009) and 
the UNCCD Secretariat has argued that achieving LDN would help to address 10 out of the 
17 SDGs (UNCCD, 2016).  
Opportunities exist for LDN advocates to learn from global experiences around not only 
offsetting, but also a range of other market-based approaches, including auctions, 
mandates, taxation measures and voluntary certification (Figure 1). These opportunities also 
extend beyond carbon and biodiversity, with experiences around watershed protection, soil 
health and bioenergy also relevant. Furthermore, aside from informing how the UNCCD 
could develop its own market-based approaches, there are also opportunities to modify 
existing MBIs to better align them with the objectives of LDN, the UNCCD and the SDGs 
more broadly. These opportunities are considered in sections 3.1 to 3.5, using case studies 





Figure 1: Examples of MBIs that can be used to enhance ecosystem services. Policy 
measures are categorized based on the nature of the incentives provided (horizontal axis) 
and the degree to which they incorporate market principles (vertical axis). Adapted from 
Baumber (2017a). 
 
3.1 Carbon MBIs 
 
Climate change represents one of the most significant areas of market-based environmental 
policy development in recent decades. The Kyoto Protocol introduced three market-based 
mechanisms under the UNFCCC: emissions-trading within national or multi-national blocs, 
such as the such as the EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS); the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM), which allows emissions reduction projects in developing countries to be 
counted against industrialised countries’ targets for emissions-reduction; and Joint 
Implementation (JI), which operates between industrialised countries and economies in 
transition (UNFCCC, 2018). Carbon trading typically works by requiring emitters of 
greenhouse gases to hold permits or meet targets relating to their emissions, with additional 
permits or credits able to be obtained through offsetting (e.g. paying for other emitters to 
reduce emissions or paying landholders to sequester carbon through land use change). 
Aside from cap-and-trade schemes with multiple buyers and sellers, other approaches 
include carbon taxes, fixed-price permit schemes (where governments act as a single seller 
of permits) and auction-based approaches (where a single buyer such as a government 
agency seeks to buy emissions reductions or offsets from the lowest bidder). 
 
Australia provides a useful case study of the potential to use carbon-related MBIs to combat 
land degradation. This is both because it has experimented with a range of carbon-related 
MBIs, including cap-and-trade, a fixed carbon price (or ‘carbon tax’) and auction-based 
approaches, and because restoration objectives have been incorporated into each of these 
policy iterations (Baumber, 2016).  In 2007, the Australian Government adopted a cap-and-
trade policy, which led to the introduction of the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS) 
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in 2011 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011). However, the CPRS only ever functioned in its 
initial format based around fixed permit prices and no caps (i.e. effectively a carbon tax), as 
the 2013 election of a Liberal/National coalition government led it being dismantled before it 
could transition to a fully-fledged cap-and-trade scheme. In place of the CPRS, an 
Emissions Reduction Fund (ERF) was introduced that employed a reverse auction approach 
to distribute Government funds to providers of emission reductions and biosequestration.  
 
Reforestation and regeneration projects were eligible to generate sequestration credits in 
Australia under both the CPRS and ERF, with the Australian Government approving a range 
of methodologies to facilitate this. Some of these methodologies are explicitly aimed at 
creating co-benefits that extend beyond carbon sequestration. For example, the 
methodology for human-induced forest regeneration has been designed to promote 
“additional benefits” such as “improved quality of your land and water supply, increased 
biodiversity and shade and shelter for stock” (Clean Energy Regulator, 2018). Further 
methodologies that combine carbon, biodiversity and other ecosystem attributes continue to 
be proposed (Waters et al., 2018). 
 
The strategic development of methodologies and guidance aimed at promoting co-benefits 
can help to overcome one of the key limitations of carbon trading, namely its focus on a 
single metric (tonnes of CO2-equivalent). This narrow focus conflicts with the much broader 
focus of land degradation neutrality, which incorporates soil health, biodiversity, productivity 
and social dimensions. While there is limited scope to vary the units of trade in carbon 
trading schemes due to the need for global-scale substitutability, governments can play an 
important role in influencing the type of carbon credits that are given preference in trading 
systems through the development of methodologies and enabling frameworks. In contrast to 
the experience in Australia, a lack of suitable methodologies and institutional support have 
been a barrier to CDM reforestation projects (Thomas et al., 2010) and the EU has elected 
to exclude reforestation activities (and any co-benefits they could potentially offer) as eligible 
sources of offsets due to concerns around data and reporting systems (European 
Commission, 2012).  
 
For advocates of LDN, the integration of SLM and restoration principles onto carbon offset 
methodologies and institutional support mechanisms offers a potential means of harnessing 
LDN objectives to the increasing market valuation of sequestered carbon through a process 
of ‘coupling’ (Liu  et al., 2007). 
 
 
3.2 Biodiversity MBIs 
As with carbon, biodiversity enhancement can be promoted using a variety of MBIs, 
including tradeable offsets, grants and auctions. In the case of biodiversity offsets, demand 
typically stems from developers wanting to undertake environmentally-damaging activities 
that would not ordinarily be permitted. Under such schemes, a gain in habitat value at the 
offset site may be used to compensate for a loss of biodiversity at the development site 
provided that there is "no net loss" overall. This principle of “no net loss” was pioneered in 
the US for wetlands in the 1970s and has subsequently been employed in other jurisdictions, 
such as Australia and the UK (Doswald et al., 2012).  
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The Biodiversity Offsets Scheme (replacing a former scheme called BioBanking) in the 
Australian state of New South Wales (NSW) provides an example of how biodiversity 
offsetting may be used to promote rehabilitation of degraded land. While the assessment 
method manual for the Biodiversity Offsets Scheme is still under development (at the time of 
writing), the previous BioBanking scheme included plant regeneration as one of the activities 
that can be used to generate biodiversity credits under the scheme, along with controlling 
grazing, retaining fallen timber, managing fire and controlling pests and weeds (OEH, 2014). 
Offsets schemes may include ‘like-for-like’ provisions and offset ratios to deal with 
uncertainty by requiring an offset area to be larger than the area lost (Quétier and Lavorel, 
2011). However, even where offset ratios result in offset areas that are much larger than the 
areas cleared, such as in NSW, there may be a time lag before ‘no net loss’ is achieved if 
offsets are based on avoiding deforestation rather than active improvement of offset areas 
(Gibbons et al., 2018). One of the recommendations of a 2014 review of BioBanking in NSW 
was that landscape-scale impacts be considered strategically when assessing development 
and offset sites, an approach which highlights the potential for synergies with the landscape 
approach being taken with the LDN Fund (UNCCD, 2018a). 
Aside from offsets, biodiversity enhancement can be encouraged through grants from the 
public or private sector, with auctions offering a mechanism for making such grant schemes 
more ‘market-based’. In contrast to the offsetting approach in NSW, the neighbouring state 
of Victoria has opted for an auction-based approach called BushTender. This process 
involves multiple providers of restoration services competing for a fixed pool of government 
funds, with a Biodiversity Benefit Index (BBI) used to compare bids (DEPI, 2014). The BBI 
score assigned to each bid is converted into a “habitat hectares” score by multiplying the BBI 
increase by the area of land restored (Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2: Cumulative hectares under BushTender agreements and gain in habitat 
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While both offsets and auctions can be used to encourage rehabilitation of degraded land, 
they differ in terms of the stakeholders they involve, the funding sources they present and 
their impacts on other ecosystems. While auctions rely on a single funding source (usually 
government), offsetting can leverage private funds for restoration. However, auctions only 
affect the areas of land being offered for restoration, while offsetting has an impact on both 
the area being restored and the area being degraded (Doswald et al., 2012). 
 
3.3 MBIs relating to other ecosystem services 
Apart from carbon sequestration and habitat for biodiversity, MBIs have also been used to 
promote other ecosystem services, such as watershed protection. In other cases, a number 
of ecosystem services have been combined together into multifunctional MBIs.  
Costa Rica provides an example of a PES scheme that includes factors other than carbon 
and biodiversity, with watershed protection and landscape beauty also attracting payments 
(Porras et al., 2013). The demand in this case stems from a desire by businesses, mostly 
hydro-electric companies, to be seen as socially responsible, with a system of certificates 
used to enable efficient over-the-counter transactions. While the main impetus behind Costa 
Rica’s embrace of PES was a desire to slow deforestation rates (resulting in 860,000 ha of 
forest being protected between 1997 and 2012), the program has also resulted in the active 
reforestation of 60,000 ha and the natural regeneration of another 10,000 ha (Porras et al., 
2013). 
The US Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) employs a multifunctional Environmental 
Benefits Index (EBI), with an auction mechanism used to select bids to be funded. While the 
CRP has a strong focus on soil health, it also contributes to reduced chemical use and other 
benefits from the re-establishment of grasses and trees (Hellerstein et al., 2015). As with 
other auction-based approaches (OECD, 2010), research into the efficiency of the CRP has 
shown its auction mechanism to be more cost-effective in delivering environmental benefits 
than offering a single fixed price to all participating landholders (Hellerstein et al., 2015). 
 
3.4 Bioenergy MBIs 
The bioenergy sector may at first seem an unusual choice for restoring degraded land on 
account of controversies around forest clearance for energy cropping (e.g. Boucher et al., 
2011; Gao et al., 2011; Gerasimchuk and Koh, 2013). However, while energy crops can, like 
other cash crops, put pressure on natural areas, they can also present opportunities to 
enhance soil health, water quality and even habitat for biodiversity in contexts where land is 
currently being managed in an unsustainable manner (Berndes and Fritsche, 2016). This is 
also true of other commercial land uses, such as agroforestry (Stanturf, 2015), but one factor 
that sets the bioenergy sector apart is the opportunity to integrate restoration objectives into 
the various MBIs used to promote bioenergy as a form of renewable energy across the 
globe (Baumber, 2017a), including mandates, feed-in tariffs and structured tax breaks.  
The most notable example of rehabilitation of degraded land being integrated into bioenergy 
support programs is the EU Renewable Energy Directive (RED), which recognises that 
some forms of energy cropping have the “potential to contribute to the restoration of severely 
degraded and heavily contaminated land” (European Parliament and Council of the 
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European Union, 2015 p. L239/5). The RED incentivises the rehabilitation of degraded land 
by allowing such activities to qualify for a “bonus” that makes it easier for a biofuel producer 
to satisfy the RED’s minimum greenhouse gas (GHG) saving requirements.  
The use of eligibility criteria and GHG life-cycle methodologies under the RED has 
similarities with the approach taken to promote environmental plantings and human-induced 
regeneration under Australia’s ERF scheme for carbon trading. However, the RED bonus for 
restoring degraded land is yet to be operationalised due to uncertainty around land-use 
change impacts (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2015) and a lack 
of guidance on which types of land might qualify for the bonus (Roundtable on Sustainable 
Biomaterials, 2015). Apart from providing supporting methodologies and certification, 
Baumber (2017a) argues that the RED could further incentivise the rehabilitation of 
degraded land by adapting its ‘double-counting’ rules to preference such activities. 
In relation to bioelectricity, Germany has experimented with bonuses for landscape 
preservation under its bioenergy feed-in tariff program. Under this program, the tariff that 
electricity companies were required to pay generators for bioelectricity increased if the 
biomass was sourced from land managed under Germany’s Compensation Scheme for 
Market Easing and Landscape Protection (Wilkinson, 2011). This scheme was aimed at the 
preservation of agricultural landscapes for both environmental and cultural reasons (Troost 
et al., 2015), but similar arrangements could be used to preference bioenergy sourced from 
degraded land that had been rehabilitated. 
Aside from mandates and feed-in tariffs, bioenergy-related grants, loans and tax breaks 
have the potential to be structured so as to preferentially support energy crops produced 
from rehabilitated land. Baumber (2017a) suggests that ecosystem services could be 
enhanced using an approach adapted from Brazil’s National Programme on the Production 
and Use of Biodiesel (PNPB). While the PNPB has provided preferential tax breaks for 
certified smallholder-produced feedstocks to achieve social objectives (Barros, 2014), a 
similar approach could also be used to incentivise the rehabilitation of degraded land. 
Structured tax breaks have also been widely used to promote biofuels in a wide range of 
jurisdictions, including the US and Australia, where they also present opportunities for policy 
adaptation. 
 
3.5 Voluntary certification 
MBIs involving offsets, tradeable credits, auctions, mandates and tax breaks typically require 
high levels of government involvement to create market structures and the methodologies 
and eligibility rules that enable the markets to function. Voluntary certification schemes, on 
the other hand, provide opportunities for non-government organisations to harness the 
power of markets to promote restoration of degraded land. For example, sustainability 
certification schemes operate in a range of different sectors, including the Forest 
Stewardship Council (FSC) in relation to forest harvesting and plantation management, and 
the Sustainable Agriculture Network (SAN), whose standards underpin the certification 
program of the Rainforest Alliance. These schemes attempt to capitalise on consumer 
concerns around unsustainable production practices and attempt to shift producers towards 
more sustainable practices in order to maintain or build market share. 
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Different certification programs inevitably prioritise different ecosystem functions and 
services over others. Furthermore, they may also place different emphasis on maintaining 
versus enhancing ecosystem services. For example, the FSC standards have a strong focus 
on preventing over-harvesting of forests and forest clearing for plantation establishment 
(FSC, 2012). In contrast, the SAN/Rainforest Alliance standards have a stronger focus on 
enhancing rather simply maintaining ecosystem functions, including by establishing 
vegetation barriers, dedicating areas to the recovery of an area’s ‘typical ecosystems’, and 
expanding ground cover to prevent erosion and improve soil fertility. The FSC has recently 
developed a model for Forest Certification for Ecosystem Services (FSC, 2015), which could 
act as an enabler of future market-based schemes involving both the private and public 
sector, particularly in countries where governments lack the capacity to develop suitable 
methodologies and monitor compliance with eligibility criteria. 
Certification schemes aimed at investors represent an emerging area of sustainability 
certification. For example, the Climate Bonds Initiative aims to mobilise investment in the 
USD 100 trillion global bond market for climate change solutions, with National Australia 
Bank claiming to be the first bank to offer a certified Climate Bond in 2014 (NAB, 2018). The 
latest version of the Climate Bonds Standard is aimed predominantly at renewable energy 
projects, but envisages that climate adaptation projects will be certified in the future and land 
use project criteria are under development (Climate Bonds Initiative, 2017). Certified 
investment of this nature could complement the LDN Fund managed by Mirova, with the 
UNCCD Secretariat potentially playing a role in certification of projects using LDN criteria. 
 
4. Challenges in incorporating LDN goals into environmental MBIs  
4.1 Risks and limitations of market-based approaches 
The adaptation of existing environmental MBIs relating to carbon, biodiversity, bioenergy, 
agriculture and forestry may provide opportunities to incentivise land uses that rehabilitate 
degraded land, to enhance the cost-effectiveness of limited public funds, and to mobilise 
new sources of funding. However, such approaches also carry risks. Using a limited set of 
indicators may neglect other important issues. For example, the narrow focus on carbon 
sequestration under the reforestation provisions of the UNFCCC has sometimes been to the 
detriment of other services, social issues and ecological values (McAfee, 2012). The 
creation of markets in particular ecosystem services can reduce the value placed on other 
services (Reed et al., 2015). 
Many MBIs require ecosystem functions to be ‘traded off’ against one another, or for impacts 
in one location to be directly substitutable for impacts at another. Carbon trading, in isolation, 
has the potential to drive the conversion of biodiverse grasslands to monocultures of trees 
that hold more carbon but lack other values. Offset schemes for biodiversity may avoid some 
of these risks, but can also involve trading off mature sites for newly-restored areas that 
cannot offer the same ecosystem functions (Gibbons and Lindenmayer, 2007). Furthermore, 
they may struggle to find appropriate locations that are far enough away from the cause of 
degradation but close enough to serve the same social and/or ecological community 
(Gonçalves et al., 2015).  
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Multifunctional indices, such as the Environmental Benefits Index (EBI) of the US CRP, have 
the potential to incentivise the provision of multiple ecosystem services. However, such 
indices inevitably require implicit or explicit trade-offs between outcomes relating to 
biodiversity, soils, water and other factors. Defining which ecosystem functions and services 
are appropriate for a particular land unit requires a range of value judgements that may differ 
depending on the interests and perspectives of those making them (Hobbs, 2016; Warren, 
2002; Zdruli et al., 2010). There is also a risk that auctions or tradeable credits that place 
monetary values on ecosystem functions deter or ‘crowd-out’ voluntary action (Hellerstein et 
al., 2015). 
The complex institutional arrangements surrounding environmental MBIs can make it difficult 
for smaller, less-developed nations to implement them and can advantage large established 
actors at the expense of small-scale producers and local communities. For example, Brazil’s 
aforementioned efforts to encourage small family farmers to grow biodiesel feedstocks 
through preferential tax breaks were initially unsuccessful and substantial participation by 
smallholders was only achieved following complementary engagement measures at the local 
level. Following the implementation of measures such as seed provision, technical support 
and the involvement of local NGOs in verifying the fairness of contracts, smallholder 
participation quadrupled between 2008 and 2010 and there was a measurable rise in the 
reported satisfaction levels (Lima, 2012). This highlights how MBIs need to be combined 
with local measures tailored to landholder needs and values if they are to create sustainable 
opportunities that contribute to environmental, social and economic objectives. 
 
4.2 Pathways forward 
To some extent, the tensions that exist between the vision of the UNCCD Strategic 
Framework 2018-2030 of a future that avoids, minimises, and reverses land degradation 
within a land degradation-neutral world, and the nature of environmental MBIs are inherent 
and unable to be fully reconciled, at least not to the satisfaction of all stakeholders. MBIs 
require a degree of substitutability to function, while land degradation is context-specific and 
involves a diverse range of impacts on soils, biota and people. However, it is important to 
note that the environmental MBIs discussed in section 3 already exist and trade-offs are 
already being made between various ecosystem functions, both explicitly and implicitly. If 
proponents of LDN do not work with the agencies and institutions operating these schemes, 
there is a risk that narrowly-focused schemes covering carbon, biodiversity, bioenergy or 
other factors proliferate while LDN objectives remain overlooked.   
Cooperation between proponents of LDN, such as the UNCCD Secretariat, and other policy-
makers face a number of challenges and barriers. For example, Akhtar-Schuster et al. 
(2017) identified a range of challenges related to the definition of LDN and its links to the 
different mandates of the three Rio Conventions, including determining appropriate 
measures, scales and baselines, and weighing up the relative importance of different 
ecosystem services. These challenges impact upon the possible synergies and interactions 
that can be harnessed between the three Rio Conventions in operationalising the LDN 
concept. Similar challenges are likely to be encountered in working with policy-makers 
managing carbon, biodiversity and other MBIs at national and sub-national levels. 
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Notwithstanding these challenges, the most promising avenues for mainstreaming LDN 
objectives into existing MBIs based on the analysis presented in this article involve: 
• modifications to certification schemes and eligibility rules for offsets, auctions and 
mandates; 
• the development of suitable methodologies, guidance and support for carbon and 
biodiversity offsets that incorporate LDN objectives; 
• the inclusion of LDN objectives in multifunctional indices used in auction-based 
approaches; and  
• the structuring of mandates, tax breaks and feed-in tariffs for bioenergy and other 
products to preferentially support practices associated with the prevention and 
reversal of land degradation.  
Aside from working with operators of existing MBIs to incorporate land degradation 
objectives, the UNCCD could develop its own market-based schemes that draw on global 
experiences with environmental MBIs for carbon, biodiversity, bioenergy and other 
ecosystem services. Of the options discussed in this article, auction and certification 
approaches may be the most relevant. LDN-specific offsetting schemes may also be an 
option in the future, but the 2017 conceptual framework for LDN treats offsetting less as a 
pathway forward and more as a cautionary tale from which LDN stakeholders can learn (Orr 
et al., 2017). In contrast, auction and certification approaches could be useful in supporting 
the LDN fund. For activities that are strategic priorities but are unlikely to turn a profit, such 
as some of the high-cost initiatives identified through the LDN pilot program (UNCCD, 
2017a), an auxiliary fund could be established with a reverse auction used to distribute the 
funds in a cost-effective manner. Certification could be used for activities that have greater 
likelihood of turning a profit, to give investors greater certainty that the actions they invest in 
are likely to meet LDN objectives. 
Complementary local-scale measures are required for any use of MBIs to promote LDN. 
Programs such as the Soil Leadership Academy (SLA), launched as a public-private 
partnership at in October 2015 offer a starting point for knowledge-building and local-scale 
support (Safriel, 2017). However, the SLA is yet to have a major impact and concerns have 
been raised about the risk of transferring Western environmental management approaches 
to other countries (Grainger, 2015). SLA partnerships with the World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development and Syngenta were also the focus of demonstrations outside the 
11th COP of the UNCCD (Namibia Press Agency, 2013). Jomo et al. (2016) calls for 
internationally accepted guidelines for private sector involvement in the delivery of the 
SDGs, including uniform accounting and reporting standards. It is crucial that supporting 
measures used to develop methodologies, share knowledge, provide technical support and 
certify practices around MBIs and LDN are developed in a manner that recognises local 
contexts, knowledge, values and interests (Orr et al., 2017), especially as drylands are often 
the ‘last refuges’ of local and traditional knowledge (Easdale and Domptail, 2014). 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
Capitalising on synergies between LDN and existing environmental MBIs offer a number of 
potential advantages compared to developing new LDN-specific MBIs. Such an approach 
avoids the need to develop and manage complex new institutional arrangements. It may 
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also enable new sources of funding to be brought to bear on land degradation challenges 
without having to allow restoration in one location to be offset against further degradation in 
another. Furthermore, such a strategy would recognise that a variety of ecosystem services 
and functions are already being traded off against carbon, biodiversity and bioenergy 
objectives under existing MBIs. Working constructively with the agencies and institutions 
managing such schemes may allow these trade-offs to be made more explicit and for 
synergistic land management practices to be preferentially supported over those with a more 
a narrow range of benefits. 
In order to better integrate LDN into existing MBIs, the UNCCD and other proponents of LDN 
will need to gain positions of decision-making or influence over eligibility rules, certification 
schemes, methodology development, the design of multifunctional indices and the 
structuring of mandates, tax breaks and feed-in tariffs. Gaining such influence represents a 
key challenge with such a strategy. Other challenges include the risk that attempts to 
quantify and value SLM and restoration outcomes end up devaluing other important factors 
or giving preference to the values of privileged stakeholders over those who are more 
marginalised. A key challenge inherent to any use of MBIs is the balance that must be struck 
between having sufficient substitutability to keep a market functioning while recognising the 
diverse environmental and social outcomes from restoration projects in different contexts. It 
is up to the Parties and mechanisms of the UNCCD and the broader community of 
landholders, researchers, practitioners and policy-makers involved in LDN to navigate these 
future policy pathways in a manner that takes advantage of the opportunities that MBIs 
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